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The Administrative Law Judge as a Bridge between
Law and Culture
By Prof. Phyllis E. Bernard*
INTRODUCTION
The agency adjudicator plays a special yet largely unrecognized
role in effective communication between the American people and
their government. More than policy-makers or policy enforcers, the
administrative law judge is expected to create a bridge between the
standards of legal conduct and the norms of cultural behavior for the
public. From the founding of the nation, America has been
comprised of diverse ethnic, social and religious groups. Yet, until
the closing of the American frontier in the early 2 0 th century, and the
rise of the urban industrial complex, Americans could circumvent the
harshest realities of this heterogeneity.
The American frontier supplied the oft-referenced "safety valve"
which allowed large segments of the population to migrate westward
and establish self-sufficient agrarian settlements with more or less
shared values. The customs and expectations of one particular
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1. A recent article offers a deft iteration of the noted historian Frederick
Jackson Turner's thesis in action:
As industry grew and the importance of agriculture declined, the new
urban workers were drawn from the farms as well as from the nine million
immigrants the nation absorbed between 1880 and 1900... .The free land to
the west had given the discontented both an outlet and an opportunity. In
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locality or specific trade or category of workers did not have to be the
same. Microcosms of the old world could exist, even thrive, within
the new world, allowing assimilation to proceed at a slower yet
steady pace. That was so until the last quarter of the 19th century,
the dawning of the modem age.
2
As the nation's economy grew more complex, relying upon
industry and mass transportation at an ever-increasing scope,
government regulation also grew. The increasing centralization of
control at the state, then federal, levels finally compelled the creation
of a single standard for conduct whereas before several may have
3been commonplace. The task of mediating between the diverse
addition, it would also draw many of the millions of European
immigrants. The individualism and optimism provided by the West kept
alive that part of the national mindset which had long vanished
everywhere else. By the end of the 1890s, the frontier had virtually
ceased to exist, and as Frederick Turner pointed out, the nation faced a
situation entirely different from any it had ever known. [cite omitted] As
free land diminished in supply, workers had less opportunity to escape the
growing, intolerable conditions of the factory; the developing class
consciousness among labor and bitterness over economic competition
became more prevalent.
P. Blake Keating, Historical Origin of Workmen's Compensation Laws in the
United States: Implementing the European Social Insurance Idea, 11 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 279, 290 (Winter, 2001).
2. The reader interested in a more detailed historical analysis of this transition
and its implications for American culture is referred to JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS
IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860 - 1925 41-42 (Antheneum
1975). Consider, for example, his discussion of the economic crisis of the 1880s
and its impact on perceptions of immigrants:
Opponents of land monopoly were quick to sense a relation between
contracting horizons in the West and unchecked immigration... Protests
arose hand in hand with a new consciousness that the supply of good
vacant land was dwindling, that it might soon give out. Once gone, where
would the United States find room for its immigrant-inflated population?
Henry George, the greatest of all the land reformers and one of the first
Americans to rage at the country's reversion toward European conditions,
connected the closing of the safety valve of western land with the danger
of immigration, as early as 1883: "What," he queried, "in a few years
more, are we to do for a dumping-ground? Will it make our difficulty the
less that our human garbage can vote?"
Id.
3. Historian Eric Foner describes the dynamics of the Progressive Era as
follows:
Most of the era's reform legislation, including changes in voting
requirements, regulation of corporations, and the overseeing of safety and
expectations of persons from diverse backgrounds has fallen
primarily to the administrative law judge (AU).4
This paper will examine the AU's evolving cultural role in this
context. We shall explore an emerging innovation which is
developing in the Niger Delta to embrace multiple legal cultures in
conflict. We shall close with preliminary suggestions on how the
Niger Delta cross-cultural model could enhance the bridge function
of agency adjudication.
Part I of this paper covers what could be characterized as the first
generation of modem administrative judging. Initially, the AU has
been expected to fuse the corporate, industrial and regulatory cultures
that come into conflict. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
5
erected a foundation for flexible hearings to attain this objective.
health conditions in factories, was enacted at the municipal and state
levels. But the most striking development of the early twentieth century
was the rise of the nation-state, complete with administrative agencies,
independent commissions, and laws establishing the parameters for labor
relations, business behavior, and financial policy, and acting as a broker
among the disputatious groups whose conflicts threatened to destroy
social harmony. These were the years when the Federal Reserve Board,
the Federal Trade Commission, and other agencies came into existence,
and when the federal government, through measures like the Pure Food
and Drug Act (1906), sought to set basic rules for market behavior and
protect citizens from market abuses.
Eric Foner, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 152 ( W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.
1998).
4. The reader interested in a wider vision of the social dimensions of this
emerging regulatory structure could hardly do better than LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed., Simon and Schuster 1985),
including the following insights about how increased market size, advances in
scientific knowledge and the attenuation of communal ties combined to create a
demand for health regulation and government oversight:
Times ... had changed. The progress of science made a growing circle of
people aware that danger lurked in food and water. The discovery of
germs, invisible, insidious, hidden in every spot of filth, had a profound
effect on the legal system. To a much greater extent than before, goods -
including food - were packaged and sent long distances, to be marketed
impersonally, in bulk, rather than to be felt, handled, and squeezed at the
point of purchase. This meant that a person was dependent on others, on
strangers, on far-off corporations, for necessities of life; society was more
than ever a complex cellular organism; these strangers, these distant
others, had the capacity to inflict catastrophic, irreparable harm.
Id. at 458. Thus arose, the call for government agencies to protect the public
against such harms.
5.5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2003).
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However, over time, the process became increasingly formalized,
complex and legalistic, losing the flexibility and innovations
originally envisioned.
To regain some of the user-friendly nature which had initially
distinguished the adjudicatory process from the civil trial, agencies
began to turn to mediation and arbitration as a supplement to the
formal adjudicatory proceeding. Part II reviews the growth of this
trend; focusing attention on the ways alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") can facilitate an informal understanding of norms and
expectations.
Part III discusses a model of peacemaking the author has
developed with the International Federation of Women Lawyers
("FIDA") in Rivers State and Bayelsa State in southern Nigeria. This
mediation model consciously takes into account social and cultural
variations extending beyond the corporate culture of industry or
agency. Rather, it reaches out to integrate and incorporate traditional
ethnic, tribal, religious and other social norms.
Part IV closes with suggestions how the principles of FIDA
peacemaking could be adapted for use in the United States. Despite
the great geographical distance that separates America from Nigeria,
several aspects of the two countries overlap in philosophically
productive ways. Namely, both countries bring together many
different ethnic groups within limited geographic boundaries while
attempting to forge a unified nation. Ultimate prosperity - indeed,
even survival - for both countries may depend upon their ability to
honor diversity while applying more or less consistent standards of
justice. Ethnicity, gender, age, social and economic class create an
often volatile mixture for both nations' legal systems. The proposals
presented here seek to recognize and include in problem-solving
some traditional values and community structures which may
facilitate successful, long-term resolution of conflicts.
I. THE FIRST GENERATION OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGING
A. Flexible Hearing Structure
The philosophy and practice of administrative adjudication under
the federal Administrative Procedure Act allows flexibility in
circumstances where a rigid, rote application of the procedural or
evidentiary rules would not be fair; or, might not readily be perceived
by a lay party as fair. Thus, the APA structures a role for the
adjudicator which is already more flexible, less formalistic than in
general civil litigation.
1. Relaxed Rules of Procedure and Evidence
a) Hearing Process Keyed to Lay Participation
The Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "APA") attempts
to be "user-friendly." Indeed, Section 555(b) clearly contemplates
that parties may appear before the agency without legal counsel being
present, or represented by a non-attorney. 6  This practice is not
without its critics. Nevertheless, the Conference on the Delivery of
Legal Services to Low-Income Persons recommended that non-
lawyer practice be supported and encouraged. Why?
The whole notion of an administrative agency
proceeding is that it should be less formal than a
judicial proceeding, in part because agency
proceedings are rarely traditionally adversarial. With
this non-adversarial informality in mind, no per se
prohibition on nonlawyer [sic] representation before
an administrative agency makes sense.7
Since parties or their representatives might be unsophisticated
about the law, the APA pares down formal adjudication, reducing
6. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b) (2003):
A person compelled to appear in person before an agency ... is entitled to
be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by
the agency, by other qualified representative. A party is entitled to appear
in person or by or with counsel or other duly qualified representative in an
agency proceeding . . . This subsection does not grant or deny a person
who is not a lawyer the right to appear for or represent others before an
agency or in an agency proceeding.
7. Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1764 (April 1999). See also,
Gregory T. Stevens, Note, The Proper Scope of Non-lawyer Representation in State
Administrative Proceedings: A State Specific Balancing Approach, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 245 (January 1990).
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those processes which the public often views as so-called "mere legal
technicalities." Courts, too, have acknowledged that the individual
confronting an administrative agency generally will benefit from
relaxed evidentiary rules.
8
b) Due Process without Undue Procedure
This does not mean that agencies operate without procedural
rules. Rather, the APA creates a floor to which agencies add such
pretrial and evidentiary provisions as suit their particular needs.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of agencies have opted to
maintain the APA's minimalist approach. 9 Thus, under Section
556(c)(4), the APA empowers the adjudicator to "regulate the course
of the hearing," but does not require a panoply of formal motions
akin to the court room's cross-complaint, motion to show cause,
etc. 1
0
Streamlining the adjudicatory process is, indeed, a most
admirable goal. Notwithstanding, one ought to proceed with caution.
In the effort to eliminate non-essential elements, it is all too easy to
inadvertently to remove procedures vital to assure claimants have
received a constitutionally adequate hearing."
8. Consider the description offered by Judge Posner for the Seventh Circuit
regarding a deportation proceeding before an Immigration and Naturalization
Service ALJ: "[T]he alien is free to try to rebut the [State] Department's advice
[that religious refugee status is no longer valid due to changes in the alien's home
country], and since the rules of evidence are not applied in proceedings before the
INS, he need not, in casting his net for helpful evidence, feel cabined by those
rules." Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 619-20 (7th Cir. 1997).
9. In the mid-1980s a study reviewed the 280 regulations governing
evidentiary decisionmaking by federal agencies. It found that 243 out of the 280
did not refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence and "appear not to impose
constraints on the discretion of ALJs to admit evidence. Often these provisions
either parrot the APA or paraphrase it." Richard J. Pierce, Use of the Federal Rules
of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1987).
10. 5. U.S.C. § 556 (c)(4).
11. What this means has evolved and continues to evolve. The anticipated
meaning of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has probably been captured
best by Hon. Henry J. Friendly in his now-classic Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1267 (1975). An intriguing 20-year retrospective was presented in
the Brooklyn Law Review Symposium issue "The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A
Twenty Year Perspective." Especially relevant articles include Alan W.
Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the 1990s, 56
BROOKLYN L. REV. 831 (Summer 1990) and the remarks of Hon. Cesar A. Perales,
c) Evidentiary Principles without Complex Evidence Rules
Perhaps the most arcane area of judicial functioning is the
treatment of evidence, such as: burdens and presumptions, offers of
proof, the laying of a foundation, hearsay and hearsay exceptions.
The APA at Section 556(c)(3) invests the adjudicator with broad
authority to rule on "offers of proof" and to "receive relevant
evidence."' 2 The following subsection (d) elaborates. The field of
admissible evidence is wide. The adjudicator in her discretion may
receive "any oral or documentary evidence."' 13 Thus, even hearsay
testimony can be permitted. The only valid objections to
admissibility are that the proffered evidence would be "irrelevant,
immaterial or unduly repetitious."'14
Most agencies have elected to follow the general principles of the
evidence rules as guidance in close cases. The National Labor
Relations Board stands nearly alone in its decision substantially to
incorporate the Federal Rules of Evidence in its hearings. However,
the reader should note that the NLRB pre-dates the APA.15
This statutory structure rests upon two foundational premises
which do not go uncontested. Ostensibly, the complex array of
hearsay rules had developed to protect lay juries from entertaining
evidence likely to sway inappropriately an untrained trier of fact.
Administrative agency determinations, however, are not rendered
through a jury system. Thus, this rationale for the rules does not
apply.
This links to the second premise: the ALJ has been selected for
this decision-making role specifically due to expertise both in the
facts and law relevant to the particular subject matter. Therefore, the
The Fair Hearings Process: Guardian of the Social Service System, 56 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 889 (Summer 1990).
12. 5. U.S.C. § 556(c)(3) (2003).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2003).
14. Id.
15. For a thorough overview of evidentiary rules in administrative
adjudications see Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal
Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1 (1971) and Richard Pierce, Use of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1
(1987).
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AU's "subject matter sophistication"' 6 places her in a uniquely
qualified position to assess credibility, without need for technical
constraints such as the hearsay rule and its exceptions.
Are these mere technicalities, or do they create objective
standards by which to measure justice? As one thoughtful critic has
pointed out, the Federal Rules of Evidence "were designed to limit
judicial power over the admission evidence without resort to whether
or not the fact finder was a jury or judge."' 17 Indeed, it could be
argued that the rules of evidence are needed even more urgently in
administrative adjudications because the AL's decisions typically
are reviewed by lay commissioners.' 8 The situation lends itself to a
paradoxical result: in settings where there are law-trained decision-
makers skilled at compartmentalizing, weighing or ignoring
problematic evidence, such as hearsay, there are fewer safeguards
than in court where a law-trained neutral decides whether evidence is
heard and how it is to be weighed.
d) Transparency in Decision-making
Finally, the APA leaves no doubt that the adjudicator's decision
must rest upon facts and evidence in the record. Section 557(c)(A)
requires that the decision be written and include a statement of
"findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, and all
the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record."' 9 The Act contemplates that there may be occasions when
the decision may be based in part upon the adjudicator's familiarity
with agency practices or institutional knowledge; this resource might
not have been cited in the record. Section 556(e) describes this
commonly occurring situation as a decision which "rests on official
notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the
record.",20 Under these circumstances, a party must be permitted an
16. Prof. Glicksman has used this apt term in his challenging analysis of the
hearsay rule. Elliot B. Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find
Administrative Law Application, 78 NEB. L. REv. 135 (1999).
17. Id. at 138.
18. Id. at 139.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(A).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2003).
opportunity to present a challenge to this unidentified evidence.
From the perspective of the lay party, this evidentiary requirement
assures that all the agency's "cards" will be "on the table;" the
adjudicator's reasons should be transparent.
2. An Active Role for the ALJ
a) The AU as a Bridge for Lay Understanding of the Process
Often one hears mediators describe themselves as advocates not
for any one party, but for the process of conflict resolution itself.
Similarly, one could frame the role of the AU in non-adversarial
proceedings as an advocate for neither the government nor the public,
but for the adjudicatory process. While not all administrative
hearings could be viewed as non-adversarial, this self-
characterization deserves a closer look, particularly since it applies to
the largest single body of hearings in government - Social Security.
If the application of a person applying for benefits under the
Social Security Disability Program has been denied, and the
reconsideration of their claims has not changed the outcome, the
claimant has a right to a de novo hearing before a federal AU. The
adjudicator in this setting takes on a different role than in the typical
trial. Instead of refereeing a combat between the prosecution and
defense, the ALJ represents the interests of the government yet
simultaneously is designated as the "neutral arbiter of the disability
claim., 2' Instead of relying primarily upon information gleaned
from the questions posed by attorneys as they examine and cross-
examine witnesses, the AU interrogates the witnesses directly.
Although a claimant is not required to appear in person, it usually
helps his or her case to do so. The AU reviews the written record of
medical exams and vocational evaluations. However, paper rarely
conveys the subtle verbal and non-verbal messages of credibility on
which the case hinges. A study by the Social Security
21. Kathleen Pickering, Note, Social Security Disability Determinations: The
Use and Abuse of the Grid System, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 579 (June 1983). The
infamous grid sought to standardize disability determinations by creating a table
displaying assessment of physical or mental ability/disability combined with
suitable employment in the national economy. Ostensibly, this array assured more
consistent decision-making by removing much of the ALJs' discretion.
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Administration which laid the groundwork for the Bellmon
Amendments-the "grid"-noted a major difference in outcomes,
depending upon whether information provided was from the
claimant's in-person appearance. 22 Approximately 60% of claimants
on average were awarded benefits. When in-person information was
removed from their case file, benefits were awarded in only 46% of
cases.
23
Why was the communication between an ALJ and the claimant so
determinative? A controversial denial of eligibility more likely than
not required an assessment of the claimant's credibility: did they in
fact experience pain of such magnitude and consistency that they
could not engage in gainful employment? Few issues in litigation are
more inherently controversial than witness credibility, both as
presented in oral testimony and in written reports.
How should the adjudicator weigh the credentials, pecuniary
interest, and thoroughness of the reports prepared by physicians on
contract with the Social Security Administration? Should the AU
doubt the reliability of reports written by the contract physicians as
compared to reports prepared by the claimant's regular physician or
another specialist not allied with the government?
How should the adjudicator understand the claimant's verbal and
non-verbal responses to the questions presented? Some persons will
carry themselves with stoic dignity in a hearing while others will
tremble and weep; yet, both may have experienced the same trauma.
Some persons will speak in a well-educated, business-like cadence
that makes the AU feel comfortable. Others will grope for words or
remain silent. Is lack of eye contact a sign that the AU should not
trust the witness? Or, was the witness' lowered gaze a sign of respect
for the adjudicator's status? 24 These are uncomfortable probes into
22. Id. (citing The Bellmon Report, Soc. Security Bull., May, 1982, at 3).
23. Id.
24. Judge Duniway's concurrence and dissent in Penasquitos Village, Inc. v.
NLRB, 565 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1977) eloquently describes the ambiguity of
demeanor and its susceptibility to misinterpretation. Judge Duniway dubs the
belief that the trier of fact can detect lies based on demeanor as "myth or folklore."
He contrasts the outwardly forthright and sincere "openness" of the "consummate
liar" against the hesitation and nervousness of the "perfectly honest but
unsophisticated or timid" witness. An expert liar could handle themselves far more
adroitly than an "average" and "non-public sort of person" facing a hostile
adjudication.
the mind of any decision-maker. Nevertheless they cannot be
ignored, or else the very process for which the AU advocates fails.
In 1983, the Social Security Administration used the grid system
to remove the wide variability in ALJ decision-making. Discretion
was significantly limited to regularize the factors ALJs could
consider in rendering their determinations. While undoubtedly the
prime objective was to reduce the amount of money paid out under
the disability program, the methodology sought to achieve that
objective by imposing a rigid structure-a grid-to control the
ineffable quality of witness credibility. It did not work. The grid did
not manage to eliminate human subjectivity-for better or for worse.
In 1991, the General Accounting Office issued a controversial
report on racial differences in the approval rates of applications for
benefits under the Social Security Disability Program. It found that
at the appeals level, where ALJs preside over in-person hearings as
described above, the rates of approval differed significantly.
"Overall, ALJs allowed benefits to 55% of appealing black claimants
under the DI program, while allowing benefits to 66% of white
appellants. 25  These differences could not be explained away by
factors such as education, attorney representation, age, gender, nor
geography.
The findings of the GAO and of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias
Task Force reveal troubling deficits in the way some ALJs have
perceived their role. These reports reflect a concern that some
ALJs-a distinct minority-have attempted to preside over non-
adversarial adjudications as if they were standard court room
litigation where the neutral could stand passively on the sidelines and
still justice would be done. Some courts have been quite articulate in
affirming that the AJ has a heightened duty to help the claimant
understand what is required in order to prove their case, particularly
when a claimant appears unrepresented by counsel. When the
claimant faces a cultural or linguistic barrier that renders this proof
25. Elaine Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1532, 1547 (1995). I do not
necessarily present these reports as demonstrations of proof on their face. My key
interest is in the public perceptions they articulate.
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even more difficult, the burden falls upon the AU to make extra
efforts to bridge the gap.26
b) The ALJ as a Bridge to Understand the Industry Culture
Conventional wisdom tells us that administrative agencies exist in
order to bridge the gap between Congress's broad, abstract, statutory
standards and the real world. Agencies refine legislative norms
through rulemaking, and further fine tune through adjudication.
Hence, ALJs are selected for the expertise they bring to the exercise
of discretion in decision-making. Their specialized knowledge
results in informed discretion to which the courts give deference.28
26. Id. at 1547 n.124 (discussing Echevarria v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982) and Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d
Cir. 1990)). See also id. at 1549 n. 126 (discussing Magistrate's Report for Pedroza
v. Bowen, cited in Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
and Lora v. Bowen, No. 85 CIV. 7063, 1987 WL 16151, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,
1987), in which the "AL's failure to probe ... the claims of an individual who
cannot speak English leads this Court to direct ... the case on remand to another
ALJ." Id.).
27. One case that unequivocally expresses the standard reading of such agency
expertise is NLRB v. Mar Salle, Inc., 425 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the
NLRB was required to determine the appropriate composition of a bargaining unit
to represent workers in a nursing home. Here, the Board had thoroughly
familiarized itself with "the respondent's business, employees and method of
operation" and then "made a unit determination consistent with established
precedent in the nursing home industry." Id. at 569. The D.C. Circuit quoted the
Supreme Court in the early case of Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.,
485, 491-92 (1947) concerning the need for flexibility: The bargaining unit
determination "is one for which no absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and
none should be by decision. It involves of necessity a large measure of informed
discretion and the decision of the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed." Id.
28. The National Labor Relations Board provides a coherent body of cases
illustrating this principle in action. Showcased is the decades-long, case-by-case
struggle to rationalize the occupational, educational, class, economic, and often
racial dynamics that characterize the work force for health care institutions.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 474 v. NLRB, 814
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987) sets forth a history of the "dance" between the NLRB,
Congress, and the courts in this area of large discretion. See id. at 700-04.
As referred to in the immediately preceding note, the NLRB has long been
tasked with determining what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit with which
an employer must negotiate. The test had been whether among a particular set of
employees their functions and skills were sufficiently similar as to create a
community of interests. If so, then they deserved separate union representation.
This can require crossing a cultural divide: Are janitors and cafeteria staff in the
same group as orderlies? Are orderlies in the same group as nurse assistants? Are
This has been the generally accepted, albeit not unquestioned,
29
perception of ALJs as expert interpreters of industry culture. Despite
intermittent expressions of caution-even of doubt and denial-we
still turn to ALJs to identify and articulate the nuances of agency
policy. For example, as an increasing number of disabled children
and adults are mainstreamed into society, how do evolving work
structures fit within the federal labor laws? When the NLRB and two
licensed practical nurses in the same group as registered nurses? Are lab
technicians in a class of their own? And where, if anywhere, does medical staff-
attending physicians, interns and residents-fit in? Key factors of determination
were written and unwritten traditions within the profession or trade and within the
hospital. Congress had required that the NLRB avoid certifying a proliferation of
bargaining units, due to the disruption that could result if the hospital employer
were required to negotiate with each and every small unit which demanded
recognition; and due to the threat to the public's health and welfare when health
care workers strike.
Mary Thompson Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980) offers a
window into the not always benign tension between Congress's statutory
delegation and instructions to the NLRB on implementation and the NLRB's
preferences. It also provides a window into the internal tensions among members
of the NLRB itself, correlating with differences in the labor-management
composition of the Board. The following cases highlight other factors in dispute,
which NLRB adjudicators were considered uniquely qualified to meld into
workable decisions: NLRB v. W. Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978)
(determining issues regarding common work stations and work interrelationships,
time spent in the same work area of the hospital (maintenance), and whether 50%
or more of their work time involved contact with maintenance employees); S.W.
Cmty Health Servs. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir. 1984) (deciding how
much of the purpose and function of the ambulance service directly related to
traditional hospital services and functions, given that ambulance employees work
away from the hospital and may transport patients to medical centers other than the
plaintiff hospital); St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 518, 522 (10th
Cir. 1989) (deciding whether "salad makers and laundry workers" have interests
sufficiently "different enough from EKG technicians and surgical technicians to
justify placing them in different bargaining units" based on "wages, education and
training, degree of interchange and commonality of supervision").
29. Judge Weis in his concurrence and dissent in Electrical Products Division
of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3rd Cir. 1980), refutes the ritual
invocation of adjudicatory expertise in determining bargaining units. Id. He would
find that acceptance "of Board 'expertise' to support conclusory 'boilerplate'
without a reasoned analysis, does not comport with proper judicial review. Id.
Studies have cast doubts on the existence of such expertise. See Getman &
Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1972);
Samoff, N.L.R.B. Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 228
(1968). Moreover, the subject matter is not so complex nor ethereal that it cannot
be understood by members of the third branch." Electrical Products Division of
Midland-Ross Corp., 617 F.2d at 991.
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U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal considered this question, the
fundamental legal issue presented was jurisdictional. For, if the
activity were not employment within the definition of the labor laws,
the NLRB did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the disabled
workers could be organized into a union with federal protection.
Sheltered workshops have attempted to provide the handicapped
with opportunities for vocational rehabilitation and occupational
therapy. At the same time, these workers produce commercial
products that are sold to the general public. A non-profit, therapeutic
or rehabilitative institution is not subject to the labor laws covering
for-profit manufacturers of the same products. Thus, in Cincinnati
Ass'n for the Blind v. NLRB 30 and Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind
v. NLRB, 31 disabled workers produced light bulbs under conditions
that severely undercut the production costs of for-profit competitors.
Ironically, the "sheltered" workers enjoyed little or no protection
from the non-profit institution. The work environments had been so
thoroughly adjusted to be in line with "traditional, for-profit business
enterprises" 32 that they were largely indistinguishable. The shelter
employer "encourage[d] its employees to increase production and
transfer[red] employees to other departments if their production
[was] insufficient." 33  The Board had also noted that employees
"work[ed] a full workweek, punch[ed] a time clock, and receive[d]
overtime compensation, health and life insurance, unemployment
benefits, workers' compensation, nine paid holidays, and paid
vacation time."
34
Further, socially unacceptable behavior-which presumably
ought to be expected as an inherent challenge for the handicapped-
was punished not treated. An employee who broke work rules, even
if due to emotional distress, could be removed from his job just as
any other worker would have been. 35 Finally, at least in Arkansas
Lighthouse, no social or counseling services were provided for
employees nor for the general community of blind persons in the
30. Cincinnati Ass'n for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982).
31. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir.
1988).
32. Cincinnati Ass'n for the Blind, 672 F.2d at 572.
33. Arkansas Lighthouse for the Blind, 851 F.2d at 182.
34. Id.
35. Id.
area.36 The Board held that the described work culture was
materially indistinguishable from for-profit sector. The evolving
phenomenon of sheltered workshops, therefore, was subject to
federal labor laws.
The "special understanding" the agency adjudicators bring to "the
actualities of industrial relations" 37 remains a vital resource that
keeps administrative law in sync with an ever-changing society. Our
nation will call upon this resource repeatedly as new technologies
replace or reorganize traditional job duties. Such changes have often
threatened an entire way of life; 38 and have been particularly
difficult for workers with few transferable skills.
In fields where industry custom has typically filled in undefined
terms and conditions of employment, those customs may be in flux.
Regardless, whether they have changed or not, the custom and
traditions of an industry, trade, profession or business
characteristically are not written and therefore cannot be researched
as precedent. Instead, they are organic things which must be familiar
to and communicated through the adjudicator on a case-by-case
basis. 39
36. Id.
37. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (quoting NLRB v.
United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 362-363 (1958)).
38. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local 1484 v. Int'l
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 781 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1986):
Historically, longshoremen . . . performed the loading and unloading of
ships, using equipment such as wire slings, rope nets, barrels, and pallet
boards; which equipment they also repaired and maintained. Machinists.
* . were responsible for the repair and maintenance of mechanical cargo
handling equipment such as trucks, tractors, lift trucks and mobile cranes.
... The arrival of the "container" on the longshores of the United States
around 1960 revolutionized the shipping industry, and with it the
traditional work assignments of many longshoremen and machinists ....
From the standpoint of dock-side labor, the most significant change
created by the containerization of the industry was the drastic reduction in
the amount of on-pier work involving cargo handling. The new
technology largely eliminated the traditional piece-by-piece loading and
unloading of cargo. In its place emerged a new need for handling,
maintaining and repairing the containers and their related equipment.
Id. at 686.
39. See Kingsport Publ'g. Corp. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 660, 661 (6th Cir. 1968)
(holding that "[a]n expired contract in the Labor-Management field must be viewed
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c) The ALJ as a Bridge for Understanding the Agency Culture
Perhaps the most controversial bridge function for an adjudicator
is his interaction with others inside the agency itself. How could this
engender controversy? The adjudicator must understand the culture
of the agency, including its enforcement philosophy and practice.
Notwithstanding, the adjudicator faces a simultaneous need to
preserve both actual and apparent freedom from the undue influence
of agency politics. Indeed, the very knowledge necessary to have
expertise deserving of deference may be founded upon understanding
how the agency interacts within and between its own units. Whether
overtly or not, the ALJ serves as a bridge between the various needs,
agendas, and expectations of the agency, particularly in terms of how
those needs, agendas, and expectations impact the public.
40Congress in the APA has commanded ALJ independence. As a
general principle, prosecutorial or investigatory and judicial-type
powers must not vest in the same persons. However, agency
members, the very people most likely to have such contacts, are
in light of its effect upon the past operation of the plant and the entire industrial
pattern which has been established, in part, by it, together with the customs,
practices, and traditions of the industry and the Company."); See also Paterson
Parchment Paper Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Paper Makers, 83 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.
Pa. 1949).
The wisdom of applying strict notions of contract law to the sphere of
labor management relations is debatable .... It may well be that the usage
of the parties or a custom in the industry will determine the issue here.
Certainly usage may be important in interpreting the requirement of
'written notice' in a formal contract .... Its significance must at least be
as great where the contract is as living and changing a thing as a collective
bargaining agreement.
Id. at 929-30.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2003).
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a
factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings.
Id. However, this prohibition does not apply "to the agency or a member
or members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C)
(2003).
exempt from this bar.4 1  The degree and quality of interaction
between agency staff and ALJs remains problematic; between
administrative judges and staff, even more so.
The nature of these unsettling concerns can evade ready
description using any objective measurements. The dynamics of
perceived bias or prejudgment are subjective and subtle. One scholar
put it well: "Ideological closed-mindedness may originate with an
individual decision maker, or it may be produced by the deciding
institution's successful socialization of the individual into its culture,
mission, and ways of thinking."42  Thus, the AU seeking to
understand agency culture is also at risk of being "captured" by the
agency itself.
Worse yet, the ALJ may have wholly adopted the agency's world
view without realizing it has happened. The process of inculcation
may occur primarily through the informal daily interactions whereby
the AU hears mostly one side of a controversy: namely, the
agency's. Such ex-parte contacts within an agency can result in a
difficult to measure but nonetheless real reduction in the openness of
an adjudicator's mind.43 "[P]olicies or laws are frequently subject to
many possible interpretations, and the existence of one-sided, off-the-
record communications about policy or law is likely to leave the




Congress devised one of its more dramatic prophylactic remedies
by dividing the responsibilities for implementing the Occupational
41. Thus, by analogy, it was permissible for members of the state medical
board to be responsible for and knowledgeable about both investigation and
adjudication of professional misconduct charges, absent evidence that the
investigation had tainted the adjudicatory result. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35 (1975).
42. John R. Allison, Combination of Decision-making Functions, Ex Parte
Communication, and Related Biasing Influences: A Process Value Analysis, UTAH
L. REV. 1135, 1201 (1993).
43. One case illustrates the public apprehension about cultural capture, where
plaintiff publishing companies moved to have a specific ALJ recused from all
adjudications before the agency due to his prior tenure as attorney-advisor to the
Commission-irrespective of whether he had had any involvement in the particular
case before him. The court refused, requiring a fact-specific inquiry on a case-by-
case basis. Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
44. Allison, supra Note 35 at 1201.
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45Safety and Health Act. Rulemaking powers reside in the Secretary
of Labor, while the Occupational Safety and Health Commission
(OSHRC) adjudicates. This split enforcement model has solved the
problem of ALJ capture within agency culture. Unfortunately, this
approach has gone to the other extreme: OSHRC has been so out of
sync with agency policymakers that their conflicting positions have
regularly formed the basis of litigation.46
B. The User-Friendly Process Bridging Objective and Subjective
Needs
The agency adjudication was intended to provide the public with
a user-friendly process that bridged, or mediated the objective and
subjective needs of all participants. The first generation of
adjudicators attempted to bridge the objective formalities of a civil
trial structure with the lay public's subjective, intuitive sense of
fairness. ALJs aspired to offer the lay public their last, best hope that
justice will be done. Laypersons could walk away from the agency
with a sense that neither tricks nor technicalities stood between
themselves and a fair hearing. Whether or not the ultimate outcome
was what the party desired, they, nevertheless, had the opportunity
"to look their government in the eye" and say what needed to be said,
and what they had to say would be heard.
Over time, these aspirations became increasingly more difficult to
achieve as the volume and complexity of agency adjudications grew.
In many agencies today, administrative litigation is virtually
indistinguishable from civil litigation, including the concomitant
45. 29 U.S.C. § 651 et. seq. (1991).
46. See dictum in Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991).
This is not the first time we have been called upon to resolve an OSH Act
'jurisdictional' dispute between the Secretary and the Commission. [cites
omitted] . . . We noted that 'enforcement of the Act is the sole
responsibility of the Secretary . . . .' The Commission's role as 'neutral
arbiter,' we explained 'plainly does not extend to overturning the
Secretary's decision not to issue or to withdraw a citation."' With regard
to the particular matter at issue, the Court held that the Secretary "is in a
better position than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the
regulations in question;" hence the Secretary's interpretation is
authoritative. Id.
costs. This phenomenon does not limit itself to administrative law.
The courts have also experienced an increase in demands for services
that far outstrip the judicial resources available. Both factors
together have combined to promote searches for creative solutions to
high costs and limited resources. The evolving answer has been
alternative dispute resolution, especially mediation.
II. ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION AS AN ADJUNCT TO AGENCY
ADJUDICATION
During the 1990s ADR started to evolve into the type of bridge
between the lay public and the agency which the ALJ has
traditionally been. The need to "translate" the agency's needs and
the public's expectations into language they could both understand
needed a simpler forum than the formal adjudication had become.
Major legislative initiatives paved the way for rapid change. Just as
importantly, the executive branch put substantial energies and
resources into developing ADR as a viable option for adjudication in
all federal agencies.
This section describes the broad contours of this development, as
a framework for later comparison with ADR in the Niger Delta. In
Part IV we shall conclude with suggestions about how the federal
ADR activities described herein could be modified, using some of the
insights gained from the FIDA peacemaking process.
A. ADR for Adjudications under the APA
Both formal and informal adjudications under the APA can be
facilitated by the use of alternative dispute resolution for all or part of
the issues under review. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1990 ("ADRA" or "the Act")4 7 required each agency subject to the
APA to establish a policy supporting the appropriate use of
negotiation, mediation, arbitration or med-arb in adjudications.
ADRA did not stop merely with enunciating a supportive policy.
47. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552 (1990), 5
U.S.C. §§ 571-583, Historical and Statutory Notes (West 1996).
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The Act required agencies to develop and implement methods for
incorporating ADR into the agencies' adjudicatory processes.
Clearly, ADRA did not mark the federal government's first use of
ADR in adjudications. Labor-management issues have long been
resolved through arbitration with the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, created by the Labor Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) in 1947. The FMCS maintains a roster of
trained neutrals ready to resolve labor disputes in virtually any sector
48of the economy.
For three decades the Community Relations Service ("CRS"), an
agency mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 has provided
non-coercive third party intervention assisting "communities and
persons therein in resolving disputes, disagreements or difficulties
relating to discriminatory practices based on race, color, or national
origin." CRS has provided conciliators and mediators nationwide to
resolve disputes involving Native American communities and other
governmental or private entities; prescriptives for avoiding racial
conflict in municipalities; addressing community racial tensions due
to police use of force.5 °
However, ADRA was the first legislation to create a
comprehensive foundation for these conflict resolution mechanisms
to be used in all agencies subject to the APA. Thus, ADRA offered
the promise of a certain modicum of consistency throughout the
federal adjudicatory structure.
1. Flexible definitions to encourage creative applications
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (hereinafter ADRA)
seeks flexibility in ADR processes by presenting a non-exclusive list
which encourages creativity in matching the dispute to the
appropriate forum for resolution. ADRA of 1996 generally retained
the language of the 1990 Act, defining "alternative means of dispute
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171- 173 (1998).
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(g) (1994)..
50. See Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Conflict
Resolution in Indian Country, Avoiding Racial Conflict, and Police Use of Force:
Addressing Community Racial Tensions, all available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crs/publist.html.
resolution" to mean "any procedure that is used to resolve issues in
controversy, including, but not limited to, conciliation, facilitation,





ADRA covers a broad range of "issues in controversy," meaning
an issue which "is material to a decision concerning an administrative
program of an agency, and with which there is disagreement. ' ' 52 This
elastic coverage has enabled agencies to develop models of
government intervention that lead to the "creative, efficient and
sensible outcomes" Congress envisioned.53
Section 556 of the APA was amended in 1990 to empower
agencies to add flexibility to hearing procedures. Under subsection
(c)(6) employees presiding at hearings can use ADR procedures
adopted under ADRA to settle or simplify issues by consent of the
parties. Further, Section 556 empowered agency hearing officers not
only to inform parties about the existence of ADR, but also to
54
encourage its use.
Nevertheless, ADRA of 1996 does not assume that litigation is
always inappropriate, nor that it should always be the last resort. The
Act lists a number of contra-indicators, mandating that an agency
consider not using alternative means of dispute resolution if:
(1) a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter
is required for precedential value, and an ADR
proceeding would not result in an authoritative
precedent;
(2) the matter involves significant questions of
Government policy that require additional
procedures before a final resolution may be made,
and an ADR proceeding would not likely serve to
develop a recommended policy for the agency;
51. 5 U.S.C. § 571(3) (2003).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 571(8) (2003).
53. See id. at n.4.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(6) (1990).
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(3) maintaining established policies is of special
importance, and an ADR proceeding would not
likely reach consistent results among individual
decisions;
(4) the matter significantly affects persons or
organizations who are not parties to the
proceeding;
(5) a full public record of the proceeding is important,
and an ADR proceeding cannot provide such a
record; and
(6) the agency must maintain continuing jurisdiction
over the matter with authority to alter the
disposition of the matter if circumstances change,
and an ADR proceeding would interfere with such
agency control.55
These factors play a critical role in the initial determination of
whether ADR is appropriate. They may also serve an important
function in determining whether confidentiality protections are
available, and if so, under what circumstances.
2. Balancing the need for open public processes and private-sector
conventions of confidentiality
The ADRAs of 1990 and 1996 attempted to strike a balance
between private sector's evolving expectations of confidentiality in
ADR disclosures, against the need for open government operations
concerning public policy and the public fisc. The compromise was:
communications made to a neutral in an ADR proceeding are
generally confidential, with some important exceptions. The neutral
can disclose such communications if the confidentiality protections
55. 5 U.S.C. § 572(b) (1996).
have been waived by all parties to the proceeding - in writing; and
the neutral agrees, also.
56
The magnitude of this exception depends upon the circumstances.
Particularly in matters involving the federal government, there is
every possibility that information communicated in a dispute
resolution proceeding (statements, data, financial documentation,
reports, etc.) has "already been made public." This information may
already be contained in some public record, such as Congressional
hearings, agency reviews, or the general news media. These already
public communications are not shielded.57
ADRA also recognized that administrative dispute resolution
takes place in a sometimes complex interplay of substantive and
procedural law. The APA is not the only controlling statute. It is
possible that a particular dispute resolution communication "is
required by statute to be made public." If so, then the neutral is duty
bound to make the disclosure. However, ADRA strongly qualifies
this duty: the neutral must ascertain that "no other person [including
entity or agency] is reasonably available to disclose the
communication." Disclosure from the federal neutral should be the
last resort.
58
3. Complementary legislative and major executive agency actions
also promoted the development of administrative dispute
resolution.
Other legislation and executive orders ensued in the early to mid-
1990s that were separate from, but highly supportive of, ADRA
1990. ADRA sought to make litigation a last, not first and only,
resort for resolving disputes with federal agencies. To that end,
ADRA promoted educating agency staff in methods of alternative
dispute resolution. Still, many cases that might have benefited from
ADR were taken to federal court. The Judicial Improvement Act of
56. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(1) (1996).
57. 5 U.S.C.A. § 574(a)(2) (2003).
58. 5 U.S.C.A. § 574(a)(3) (2003).
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19901, significantly reduced the availability of this "by-pass": if an
administrative agency case was referred to a federal judge who
believed that ADR would be helpful, the judge was empowered to
refer the case to ADR. Federal court-annexed ADR grew,
strengthened by the dictates of the Judicial Improvement Act.
The Department of Justice ("DOJ" or "the Department")
recognized that ADR could save time and money, and could increase
public acceptance of agency decisions. Yet, these improved
outcomes would only occur if government attorneys learned the
different sets of skills necessary to be an effective representative in
these more flexible, non-trial type forum. In Spring 1995, the
Department issued OBD 1160.1 to coordinate ADR among all
components of the Department and all its attorneys. All ADR
activities for the Department were to be coordinated through the
newly created position of Senior Counsel for ADR. 60 This
comprehensive order required each component in the Department to
establish a formal ADR policy that clarified: ADR should be used as
widely as possible for civil matters. All attorneys in the
Department were to receive training in negotiation, mediation and
arbitration. 6
2
On February 5, 1996 President William J. Clinton effectively
enlarged the policy and direction articulated in OBD 1160.1 to
include all federal agencies in the executive branch. Executive Order
12,988 on "Civil Justice Reform" required all litigation counsel in
non-criminal matters make reasonable efforts to resolve disputes
before trial. Litigation should be the last, not the first resort, of
federal agencies. To further this goal, Executive Order 12,988
ordered all agency litigation counsel to receive training in ADR.63
Two years later President Clinton directed the heads of executive
departments and agencies to create an Interagency Alternative
Dispute Resolution Working Group (IADRWG) to "promote greater
use of mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, agency
59. Judicial Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (1990).
60. U.S. Department of Justice Order OBD 1160.1 (Spring 1995).
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Executive Order No. 12,998, § 1(c)(3), Civil Justice Reform published at
61 Federal Register 4,729 (1996).
ombuds, and other alternative dispute resolution techniques. ' 64 This
committee, now better known as the Federal ADR Council, assists
agencies in: developing ADR programs; training agency personnel in
ADR usage; developing procedures to assure neutrals can be
obtained on an expedited basis; and record-keeping to monitor the
benefits of administrative dispute resolution.65
This was an important step in institutionalizing administrative
dispute resolution. The 1990 Act had relied upon the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) to provide on-going
consultation and training in ADR activities, and to coordinate the
growth of ADR in federal agencies. Upon the demise of ACUS, the
1996 Act required the President either to designate an agency to do
the work envisioned for ACUS, or to create an inter-agency
committee.
B. ADR Under Other Federal Statutes Governing Agency
Adjudications
1. Labor-Management Relations
A number of federal activities operate under ADR programs apart
from the APA. Most prominent among them is the area of labor-
management relations. When a dispute arises under the NationalLaborRelaionsAct,66
Labor Relations Act, 6notice must be given to the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The FMCS will meet promptly
with the parties and "use its best efforts by mediation and
conciliation to bring them to an agreement." The statute imposes
upon the parties an obligation to bargain in good faith, to participate
"fully and promptly" in such meetings. For prevention of unfair
labor practices, the NLRA provides even broader power for
64. Memorandum from William J. Clinton, President of the United States,
Designation of Interagency Committee to Facilitate and Encourage Agency Use of
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking (May 1,
1998), IADRWG homepage at
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/direct/memos/disputre.html>.
65. Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d)(C) (2003).
Spring 2003 The Administrative Law Judge
26 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-1
alternative dispute resolution. Under 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) if the
parties have agreed to use "methods for the voluntary adjustment of
the dispute," then the NLRB itself will not hear and decide the
dispute, taking the resolution out of the hands of the agency.
Similarly, ADR has long been used to resolve labor-management
issues involving employees of the federal government. The Federal
Labor Relations Act (FLRA) at 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (a) and (b) mandates
a negotiated grievance procedure that must be fair, simple, and
expeditious. The FLRA also requires binding arbitration to resolve
disputes that cannot be handled through negotiation. 67 The U.S.
Postal Service has institutionalized a major mediation pro gram to
resolve employee-management disputes in their early stages.6N
2. Discrimination
A handful of federal agencies have more recently developed
ADR processes to encourage consensual resolution of disputes.
Conflicts arising in the workplace, schools, or service agencies
involving a continuing relationship between the parties seem
especially suitable for mediation or negotiation, rather than
adjudication. Thus, the Under Secretary of Labor is statutorily
required to use ADR mechanisms "to the maximum extent possible"
to resolve disputes about access to services for individuals seeking
vocational rehabilitation services. 69Again, the authorizing statute
provides a fairly broad definition of ADR, encouraging a
combination of procedures, not merely negotiation or mediation.
Parties may choose to bypass formal adjudication to resolve
disputes concerning public services accommodations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. In particular, the use of mediation
for such cases allows for expression of personal perspectives, and
encourages a degree of disability education. Traditionally, formal
67. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 7117, 7119 (2003).
68. 39 U.S.C. § 1207(2003).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 732 (a), (g) (2003).
70. 2 U.S.C. § 1331(d)(2-3) (2003).
adjudication does not have room for such a broad agenda. By taking
a broad approach, mediation can achieve consensual resolutions. 7 1
Congress, in Title I of Pub. L. 102-166, section 118, encouraged
the use of settlement negotiations, conciliation, fact-finding,
mediation and arbitration to resolve employment discrimination
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).72 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has begun to refer to mediation
discrimination claims that seem to turn more on interpersonal
dynamics than upon readily provable facts and law.
When a child with disabilities has been "mainstreamed" into
public schools, and conflicts arise concerning the appropriate
handling of the child's curriculum and other needs, the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act,73 requires mediation. This
process offers a forum to explore the deep emotional issues triggered
by: the concern of multiple persons about the best interests of the
affected child, the role of the child's family, and the impact of
decisions upon others in the classroom.
3. Consumer Complaints
In contrast to the continuing working relationships typified in the
cases referred to ADR above, several agencies have developed ADR
programs to negotiate a settlement to complaints by consumers about
a particular incident involving a regulated entity. These processes
attempt to make the adjudicatory process more "user-friendly"
through efficiency, simplicity and flexibility. In so doing, the
agencies significantly improve their responsiveness to the needs of
taxpayers.
The Securities Exchange Commission has a well-established
arbitration program to handle disputes arising in connection with
71. See also 42 U.S.C.§ 12188 (2003) (providing alternative means of dispute
resolution where private entities provide public accommodations); 42 U.S.C.
§12212 (2003) (providing negotiation, conciliation or mediation to assure equal
opportunity for individuals with disabilities).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2003).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2003).
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74prospectuses and communications, and other claims involving the
registration and sale of securities. The Department of Agriculture
has a parallel program to handle complaints against persons
registered as commodities dealers. 76 15 U.S.C. § 2310 provides for
ADR as a remedy in consumer product warranty complaints. 77
4. Taxation/Financial Matters
Negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration can offer the
most effective way to resolve a highly technical, complex dispute.
The more relaxed procedures of informal settlement facilitate more
efficient disposition of matters than formal adjudication. Thus,
disputes over employer withdrawals under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Program (ERISA),78 can be resolved through ADR
methods. In the past few years, the Internal Revenue Services has
inaugurated a system of appeals dispute resolution that offers
mediation to disgruntled taxpayers.79
Powerfully emotional conflicts between disgruntled farmers
(debtors) and local bankers (lenders) during the late 1980s led to the
creation of a mediation process to resolve foreclosures under the
Farm Service Administration, Department of Agriculture. This
process has permitted a blend of complex financial problem-solving
and personal reconciliation, critical to the stability of rural
communities. 80
5. Flexibility in Enforcement of Bureaucratic Standards
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has a fairly extensive
statutory framework for control of environmental pesticides. Title 7
U.S.C. sections 136 et seq. cover registration of pesticides;
registration of establishments; recordkeeping; sale, use, and removal
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77 1(2003).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 -78 t (2003).
76. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2003).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (2003).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(2003).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 7123 (2003).
80. 7 U.S.C. § 5103 (2000).
of pesticides. 8' This complex of standards is flexibly enforced by
using alternative methods of dispute resolution rather than formal
adjudication. The USDA has also used statutory authority to create a
system to arbitrate and mediate disputes concerning the sale of milk
and milk products.82
The management of government purchasing arrangements has
long required mechanisms for negotiation of disputes. Speedy
resolution of discrepancies, protests, and appeals has required
something other than formal adjudication. The negotiation,
mediation and arbitration provisions established for public contracts
have installed procedures that business people can recognize from the
private commercial sector.
83
6. Tribal Sensitivity in Federal Programs
Negotiation and mediation have come only recently to many
federal agency programs. However, these processes have been an
indigenous part of conflict resolution among Native American
nations for millennia. In recognition of the central role that face-to-
face discussion plays in Native cultures, the administrative process
for overseeing contracts or grants under the self-determination
programs includes ADR.84
C. ADR through Procedural Rules
In addition to the many statutes that explicitly authorize particular
ADR processes for adjudicatory matters, a great number of agencies
have implemented ADR through procedural rules.
Some ADR regulations elaborate greatly upon the statutory
framework.85 The Department of Justice adopted regulations
implementing ADR processes to handle claims of discrimination due
81. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et. seq. (2000).
82. 7 U.S.C. § 671 (2000).
83. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 1301 - 1303 (2003); 41 U.S.C. §§ 605 - 607 (2003).
84. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450j, 450 1(2003).
85. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 31.29,170.8, 180.1 - 180.5 (2003).
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to disability in state and local government services, and
discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations.
86
Among other agencies, however, ADR procedures appear to be a
whole new body of regulation, which is implied, rather than
expressed. For example, the Department of Transportation's Federal
Aviation Administration uses ADR as a central method for resolving
complaints and contract disputes. 87 The same applies to arbitration
and negotiation of disputes under the statutory jurisdiction of the
88Surface Transportation Board. In both of these agencies, arbitration
exists as an implied principle in their enabling acts, but not as an
express program mandate. Similarly, the Appeals Board for the
Department of Health and Human Services has used implied
authority to develop a successful and respected comprehensive
program of mediation to resolve disputes concerning grants and
contracts.89 The Provider Reimbursement Review Board has
implemented a successful mediation program for Medicare Part A
disputes. 9° Arbitration of disputes concerning rights of way, tram
roads and logging roads has been read into the statutory authority for
the Bureau of Land Management. The Federal Communications
Commission has turned to ADR when reviewing the compliance of
emerging technologies with evolving industry standards.92 Finally,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development used implied
authority under the Fair Housing Act to develop procedural rules on
conciliation.
93
86. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.176 and 35.506 (2003).
87. 14 C.F.R. §§ 16.21, 17.9, 17.27, 17.33 (2003).
88. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1108.1 - 1108.12, 1109.1, 1144.2 (2003).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 16.18 (2003).
90. 43 C.F.R. § 2812.4-1, 2812.4-3, 2812.4-4 (2003).
91. Id.
92. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1703 (2003); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1003(m)(2) (2003)
(parties have the option to resolve a complaint concerning multi channel video
program access by ADR instead of a formal hearing); and 47 C.F.R. § 76.1513
(2003) (dispute resolution processes for open video systems).
93. 24 C.F.R. § 103.300, 103.335 (2003).
D. Does Rapid Growth + Rapid Institutionalization = Rapid Loss of
Innovation?
Administrative dispute resolution has developed successfully
through a combination of amendments to the APA, agency
innovation, and inter-agency coordination. ADRA has benefited
from the intense and wide-based attention it has received. For now,
there seems to be a good, if not always easy, balance between the
need to assure flexibility for innovation, and some modicum of form
and consistency from agency to agency. The issue of confidentiality
will need to be monitored carefully over the next couple of years as
agencies, the public and the courts work through the pragmatic
details of applying the guidelines proposed by the Federal ADR
Council.
One must question, however, whether ADR in administrative
adjudications risks becoming more than consistent. ADR may risk
becoming ossified into a set pattern that fails to reach beyond
standard civil/commercial evaluative mediation. ADR risks
becoming simply one more formalistic hurdle that litigants pass over,
replete with motions practice and appeals. ADR may soon become
no true alternative to the courtroom unless we can look beyond our
American models to see what features from other countries and
cultures could enliven our work.
III. BRIDGING LAW AND CULTURE IN THE NIGER DELTA
In Parts I and II we explored the concept of administrative
adjudication itself as forming a bridge between law which is (1)
general, non-specific, and broad, and (2) its application to the
narrowly focused, pragmatic problems of individuals. The American
system of administrative justice relies primarily upon the ALJ to
justicially close this gap justicially at both objective and subjective
levels. Yet, as the complexities of administrative adjudications have
increased, a parallel concern has grown. ADR may be needed to
assure that adjudicative function remains flexible and genuinely
responsive to a lay public.
The renewed vigor with which the federal government has
pursued ADR can be viewed as one element in the global trend
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towards harmonization of laws. This is a significant step in the
realization of truly interdependent international trade. Thus, it is not
surprising to find that Nigeria has also turned its attention towards
the development of ADR as an adjunct to its civil and administrative
processes.
In Part III we return to the foundational quaere: How can one
build an ADR system that is user-friendly but not user-biased? In the
Niger Delta this inquiry carries a hefty weight not yet characteristic
of the U.S.A. For, when the adjudicator seeks to mediate within the
context of Nigeria's "culture wars"' s/he wrestles not with a glib
metaphor, but with a viable threat of bloody, violent clashes over
culture. 94 Hence, the bridge function takes on an added potency and
immediacy which American ALs and mediators have not regularly
encountered to date. America's diverse population continues to grow
94. The reader should be reminded that the region of Nigeria under discussion
was once part of the short-lived Republic of Biafra in the 1960s. Minority tribes of
the recently-designated South-South chafed under the domination of the majority
Igbo tribe; split away and led the blockade of the Niger River. The infamous
Biafra Blockade resulted in a famine that killed more than a million Igbos and
ended the civil war. The imprint of this holocaust remains strong. As one
researcher concluded in 1988 "Most adult Nigerians have directly and poignantly
experienced protests, riots, even massacres, civil war and coercive military rule."
WILLIAM D. GRAF, THE NIGERIAN STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY, STATE CLASS AND
POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA 13 (1988), quoted in Philip C. Aka,
Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic Reconciliation in the New
Century, 14 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 327, 333 (Fall 2000). Prof. Aka offers an
excellent background on the "Nature of Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria" in
Part III of his article. Id. at 330-37. Regarding contemporary ethnic politics in the
Niger Delta and pervasive violence Prof. Aka notes:
Briefly, three categories of conflicts, all of which have generated violence
resulting in many deaths and large-scale destruction of properties, have
characterized this brief period [of civilian rule]. The first consists of old
conflicts from the historical past exacerbated by military rule and which
continue to fester even with the installation of democratic politics. The
trouble in the Niger Delta involving oil-producing minorities [e.g., the
Ijo/Ijaw, Ikwerre, Ogoni, Ibibio] falls into this category. [cite omitted] The
second category consists of formerly suppressed conflicts that are now
coming to the fore, aided and abetted by the climate of freedom and
reduced repressiveness democratic politics affords. [cite omitted] The
numerous inter- and intra-ethnic disputes in parts of the country,
especially over communal lands, belong in this second category. The
third and final category ... are religion-based, sharia-related, conflicts,
which negate the country's political stability, challenge its secular status,
and question its continued integrity as one country. [cite omitted]
Id. at 334.
rapidly without the benefit of its traditional frontier "safety valve."
Depending upon economic and social factors, the U.S.A. may
confront similar cultural strains in the 2 1 " century.
A. The FIDA Village Peacemaker Model
The solution crafted by the International Federation of Women
Lawyers (FIDA) in Rivers and Bayelsa States seeks not merely to
harmonize laws. Rather, FIDA seeks to harmonize systems and
cultures of dispute resolution. Their solution strikes a subtle and
non-static balance between the distinctive elements that lead persons
to pursue formal litigation in a civil or customary court, 95or informal
mediation and conciliation.
When a dispute has arisen in Rivers or Bayelsa States, two FIDA-
trained and supervised village peacemakers meet jointly with the
disputants early in the developing conflict. The peacemakers use
facilitative techniques of restating and reframing to understand each
disputants' perspective. The peacemakers consult with their assigned
group of ten other village peacemakers in the area to determine the
most suitable type of intervention under the circumstances.
Intervention could be via indigenous methods, the local Customary
Court, or usage of the civil or criminal courts.
95. Customary Courts were originally created by the British as a primary
mechanism of indirect rule. They represent the external authority discussed in
section A.3. of this paper, in contrast to the power embodied in the indigenous
system of conflict resolution through traditional social groups. F.U. OKAFOR, IGBO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 93-94 (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1992). In 1900, the
British colonial government established Native Courts by proclamation. The
Native Courts were intended to be a principal mechanism for controlling the
indigenous population. In many ways one could describe the early Native Courts
as an attempt to circumvent the traditional or so-called "natural rulers" who
exercise power through the indigenous institutions. By 1930 the colonial
administration was forced to adapt the Native Courts to align more closely with
traditional practices. Instead of authority resting in warrant chiefs selected by the
British and backed by the military and administrative power of the colonial regime,
Native Court judges were selected by the villages themselves. Usually, the person
elected was the traditional village chief or king. In 1956 the name "Native Court"
was replaced by "Customary Court." Id. In the estimate of some scholars of these
legal systems, "[n]either the 'Native Court' as amended nor the 'Customary Court'
could replace effectively the traditional legal system .... " Customary court
remains as an option, but one rarely used. Id.
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If the disputants desire, the F1DA peacemakers then return to the
disputants and to the relevant traditional leaders to prepare all for
participation in crafting a resolution process. At that point the FIDA
peacemakers step out of the picture. The FIDA peacemakers are
described as "mid-wives of change;" not the change itself. The FIDA
peacemaking process itself, then, becomes the bridge between law
and culture.
B. Harmonizing Distinctive Elements
Successful venues and methods of dispute resolution must speak
to the objective and subjective needs of the disputants. For some
matters, such as those requiring interpretation of a constitutional or
statutory provision, no genuine option exists outside of the civil
courts. For other matters, however, persons could achieve their
underlying interests more fully by pursuing one or more alternative
methods. The FIDA model does not attempt to supplant the Anglo-
Nigerian system of civil and administrative litigation. Instead, it
seeks to supplement those processes by encouraging informed,
voluntary participation in carefully selected traditional institutions
respected by the disputants.
What distinctive elements must be addressed? We shall examine
them below, as they manifest in the contemporary Niger Delta.
1. Formalism versus Flexibility
Justice, fairness, a re-balancing of power, transparency and
accountability are typically seen as the best products of a formal
adjudicatory process. Litigation achieves these results through the
competitive clash of attorneys, relegating parties to the side-lines of
the action. Formalism might impede the expression of individual
creativity and feelings, yet it protects individual rights. This
paradigm of justice is enshrined in the Anglo-American common law
systems, which also frames the Nigerian civil and administrative
court structure.
96
96. I have elected not to analyze the Customary Courts for this paper.
Although federally sanctioned, formal Customary Courts exist in the Niger Delta
typically do not play as prominent a role as the informal indigenous methods this
Under the Anglo-Nigerian model of justice, fairness is
synonymous with formalism. This being so, suggestions to reduce
formality through the use of ADR can encounter deeply embedded
skepticism, even hostility. Resistance can run deep, despite
supportive pronouncements emanating from the bench and bar.
Formality and ritual define the very look of justice in Nigeria, in
ways unfamiliar to Americans. White wigs and black robes are
mandatory garb in Nigerian civil courts. Forms of address in
everyday life include honorifics such as "Your Excellency," and are
routine in the civil and administrative courts. Finally, the system is
intended to move slowly, inexorably.
Although the British did not invent bureaucracy, one could fairly
say that the British colonials perfected stifling bureaucratic
inefficiency. They invented the now-infamous red tape, which bound
innumerable government files; a phrase describing the frustrating
process of working one's way through repeated administrative
roadblocks.
At a more profound level, Nigerian independence from colonial
rule and the end of the Biafra War/Nigerian Civil War gave rise to a
federal concept of justice seeking to transcend differences in ethnic
and religious traditions. Nigeria's federal law offers a standard for
resolving disputes that is not captive to any one particular
demographic group. Despite the demerits of its imperialist origins,
paper discusses. Additionally, this paper focuses on potential parallels to American
social structures that could be adapted to serve similar roles. Except for the tribal
courts in sovereign Native American nations, the Anglo-American system has no
parallel to the Customary Courts. The reader interested in a fuller description of
how Customary Courts typically operate in contemporary Nigeria should refer to
ONEYBUCHI T. UWAKAH, DUE PROCESS IN NIGERIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SYSTEM: HISTORY, CURRENT STATUS, AND FUTURE 31-60 (University Press of
America, 1997) (see Chapter 2, "Nigeria's Native Law, Customs and
Administration.") Especially helpful may be the description of a prototypical land
dispute, which begins with private settlement attempts, but moves quickly to a
Customary Court summons and hearing with "as many responsible relatives"
attending as each party can achieve. The arbitrators will hear the case. If it is
"purely a matter of moral (or social) obligation" the parties will be asked "to go
back and have it settled 'at home' (that is, privately)" since it is not a case "for
legal proceedings." If, on the other hand, the case does have legal foundation, then
a formal hearing commences, with testimony by witnesses, evidence, comments on
the merits and demerits of each side's case. The decision is reached in a private,
secret session. Appeal is available to another arbitral court. Id. at 37-38.
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Nigerian federalism has been remade to find common ground on
which the most populous nation of Africa could potentially unify. 97
But for now, all of this has been undermined by lack of trust.
Those vested with the duty to protect the system's integrity have
stumbled badly. The judiciary has come under suspicion for
widespread corruption, graft, and bribery. 98
In a system where the arbiters of justice themselves are
sometimes perceived as unjust, one would expect a call for increases
97. I recognize that to date Nigeria's sometimes tentative unity could be
labeled "false" as was well explained by Prof. Pade Badru in his book IMPERIALISM
AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN NIGERIA, 1960-96 136-139 (Africa World Press, 1998). I
further acknowledge that good reasons may exist to question whether unity is an
ideal to seek, given that "Nigeria" is an artificial construct, created by Britain 'to
facilitate their control of the area's natural resources easier. Britain's objective was
to prevent subject peoples from transcending ethnic differences, so they could not
form sustained opposition to colonial exploitation. Some legal scholars have begun
to suggest that respect for the right of self-determination will require a redrawing of
boundary lines in order to preserve "social equilibrium" and to promote "the rule of
law." Okechukwu Oko, Partition or Perish: Restoring Social Equilibrium in
Nigeria through Reconfiguration, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 317, 324 (1998).
And, taking a more global perspective, Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The
Re-emergence of Self-Determination, and the Movement toward Smaller,
Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 209 (1999).
98. For a couple of years, Nigerian newspapers have been replete with reports
on investigations by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC). As of December 2002, forty-seven judges had been indicted,
including two Chief Judges and four High Court judges. Some judges in the Niger
Delta states of Abia, Cross River, Delta, Imo and Rivers have also come under fire.
See Indicted 47 Judges have Persistent Reputation for Corruption, Says Esho,
VANGUARD, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, December 21, 2002 available at NEXIS:
Library: NEWS; File: AFRNWS; Eso Report: NJC [National Judicial Council]
Suspends Indicted Judges, THIS DAY reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, October 13,
2002.; Delta Sacks Two Corrupt Judges, VANGUARD, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS,
October 31, 2002; Justice Kalu 0. Amah, THIS DAY, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS,
August 28, 2002. (See also Abia Judge Dragged to Anti-Graft Panel, Id.) (reporting
that the Abia state branch of the Nigerian Bar Association had declared a boycott of
the courts to protest the continued stay in office of the Chief Judge of Abia State.);
Imo Government Warns Corrupt Judicial Officers, VANGUARD, reprinted in
AFRICA NEWS, August 13, 2002. Many of the allegations of judicial corruption
represent the difficulties of transitioning from a military rule, where "the judiciary
was not independent of the military regime," as described by the VANGUARD
newspaper in Law & Human Rights: Time for a Judges' Revolt? November 29,
2002 reprinted in Africa News. Id. This article details a pattern throughout Nigeria
of judicial salaries being delayed for months or effectively denied by the state
governments; court staffs on strike; and perennial shortages of "necessary working
facilities such as courtrooms, books, typewriters, stationery, and files." Under such
difficult working conditions, particularly when judges cannot meet the costs of
supporting their families, judges become susceptible to corruption.
in procedural and administrative protections. And, indeed, some of
that is afoot.99 Notwithstanding, parties and attorneys are more than
willing to pursue a resolution method that will take less time and
offer more legitimate control over the outcome. 100 Ironically, it may
be that parties are more likely to find the qualities of transparency,
accountability and re-balancing of power through ADR than through
litigation.
99. DAILY TRUST, Jan. 30, 2002 (remarks of Chief Justice of the Federal
Court Mohammed L. Uwais, urging for a total separation of judicial power,
including appointment and salary, to undergird an improvement in case
processing); See also National Centre for State Courts Holds Workshop on Rule of
Law, THIS DAY, Dec. 17, 2002 (repeating that the U.S. State Department has
committed substantial technical assistance to improve functioning of the Nigerian
judiciary through the Rule of Law pilot projects in Lagos, Abuja and Kaduna); See
National Centre for State Courts Holds Workshop on Rule of Law, THIS DAY,
reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, December 17, 2002 (reporting that the World
Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also taken an interest in a broad-
based reform of the Nigerian Justice Sector Community, as described in Justice
Sector Reform: Where are the Road Maps?, THIS DAY, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS
(January 14, 2003).
100. Ige Pledges Support for NCMG, THIS DAY, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS,
October 29, 2000. The Negotiation and Conflict Management Group (NCMG) was
established in Lagos to promote ADR in both private and public sectors. The
statement of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Chief Bola Ige made at a
seminar by the NCMG is noteworthy. As reported: He "called on the Federal
Government to emulate the United States of America which has adopted the ADR
as alternative in resolving civil cases. [sic] Ige said that Nigeria, at this stage of its
development 'definitely cannot afford to be left behind in this wind of legal reform
and change.' He said that conflict resolution is sin qua none [sic] to Nigeria, more
so with her 'nascent democracy and dire need for foreign investments."' Id. See
also: Dispute Resolution as Panacea to Court Congestion, THIS DAY, reprinted in
AFRICA NEWS, November 7, 2000; Nigeria: A Way Forward, THIS DAY, reprinted
in AFRICA NEWS, January 23, 2001 (promoting American-style ADR as presented
in the recently published book by ROBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2001)). In 2001, the
U.S. State Department committed major funds to establish in Lagos state judiciary
ADR reforms based on the American Bar Association model of the multi-door
court house and a companion Judges Mediation Programme, as reported in THIS
DAY, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, December 10, 2001. Lagos State Justice Ministry
established a free citizen's mediation center to resolve "minor and major disputes"
such as "rents, landlord/tenant debts, employer/employee, and family
disagreements." VANGUARD, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, April 10, 2001. These
are important advances and deserve support. They do not, however, actively seek
to incorporate the traditional, indigenous dispute resolution processes that are
central to the FIDA peacemaking model.
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2. Public Policy Versus Private Justice
Thoughtful observers of ADR in the United States have asked the
continuing question: When does the private ordering of ADR begin
to compromise the development of the common law? 1° 1 This
underlying concern rises to a higher level when we consider the
appropriate and inappropriate use of ADR in regard to public policy,
public monies, and public resources. Again, American politicians do
not have a monopoly on graft. Nigeria has suffered under the
debatable characterization as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world.102
Be that as it may, we need not concern ourselves with the
truthfulness or untruthfulness of such pronouncements. The key
issue is the public perception it bespeaks, the pervasive sense that
adjudications are highly subject to bias or conflicts of interest, based
on financial or political interests. To cure bias and conflicts,
decision-making must be in the open. Confidentiality and
accountability are not compatible. Mediations occurring behind
closed doors bear uncomfortably close resemblance to shadowy deal-
making between political operators.
The peacemaking model developed through the International
Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) in the Niger Delta has struck
a balance in the dynamic dance between public and private interests.
A first step in the dance is understanding that what is considered
"public" and "private" in the Niger Delta may differ from the usage
of those terms in America. In the Niger Delta, unincorporated,
fraternal and family groupings of individuals whom Americans
would characterize as wholly private, typically undertake duties that
Americans would expect to be public works, for example, the
101. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
102. Legitimization of Corruption, THIS DAY, reprinted in AFRICA NEWS,
October 13, 2002. One source for this oft-repeated assessment is the report of the
NGO Transparency International ranking Nigeria as the "second most corrupt
country in the world," as referenced above. Id. The World Bank/IMF has recently
shifted its policy on corruption. Rather than treating it as a political problem
"outside their purview," they are now moving this issue "to the top" of their
"agenda," treating corruption, bribery and graft as an unacceptable drain on money
for development assistance. Fighting Corruption - Myth or Reality?, VANGUARD,
reprinted in AFRICA NEWS, February 21, 2003.
building of schools and the repair of community centers.'0 3 On the
other hand, a private matter in the Niger Delta is rarely one occurring
between two individuals alone. Such cases would likely refer to a
family rather than an individual. This would not necessarily be the
nuclear family of close consanguinity; rather, what most Americans
103. As described among the Ijo/Ijaw, older women (the okusi ere) and older
men (the okosi-otu palemo) are "responsible for the planning and organization of
community projects and for the town's welfare." The women's association
includes "a spokeswoman, a treasurer, a secretary and a town crier for the whole
town and one for each quarter. These women are responsible for ... settling
disputes, and for discussing women's aspects of community development with the
men." MARIDA HOLLOS AND PHILIP E. LEIS, BECOMING NIGERIAN IN IJO SOCIETY
76 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1989).
Throughout this section, references will be made to scholarly works the reader
can seek on their own. Many of these sources will discuss the traditional ways of
the Igbo, because more has been published concerning this regional tribe that can
be readily obtained in the West. Anthropologists and most political scientists
would categorize many of the tribes in the South-South Niger Delta region as
related to the Igbo, or at a minimum, still highly influenced by Igbo culture. I
greatly appreciate the insights provided by the following persons who participated
in a series of workshops I facilitated under the auspices of a U.S. State Department
grant "Nigerian Mediation Exchange," sponsored by the American Bar Association
Africa Law Initiative and the ABA Dispute Resolution Section, held in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma and Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria during June and July of
2002: Barrister Mrs. Elsie Nwanwuri Thompson, Deputy Country Vice President-
FIDA Nigeria; Barrister Mrs. Didi Walson-Jack, Director of Legal Services,
Bayelsa State House of Assembly, later appointed Attorney General and Minister
of Justice for Bayelsa State; The Hon. Vivien Ere Imananagha, Deputy Chief Whip
and Chairperson of the Committee on Health and Women's Affairs and Social
Development, Bayelsa State House of Assembly; Her Excellency Mrs. Owanari
Bobmanuel-Duke, partner in the law firm of Duke and Bobmanuel, Lagos and First
Lady of Cross River State; The Hon. Barrister (Chief) Nixon Bright Erewari,
Chairman, House Committee on Justice, Judiciary and Related Matters, Bayelsa
State House of Assembly; The Hon. Barrister Bassey Eko Ewa, Majority Leader
Cross River State House of Assembly and Chairman of the Committee on Judiciary
and Public Service Matters; and Chris W. Ogbondah, Ph.D., Professor of
Journalism, University of Northern Iowa. Their guidance assured that the training
in advanced forms of the FIDA peacemaking model discussed within this paper
would ring true to the cultural traditions and practices of the region.
It is very possible, however, that in my own attempts to restate these insights
for purposes of scholarly analysis, some detail of processes and terminology have
been edited out. My apologies. I also feel it necessary - since the observer never
stands wholly apart from the observed - to acknowledge for the reader that I am
West Indian-American, with strong tribal affiliations to the Igbos of South-South
and Southeastern Nigeria. I hope this has not unduly colored my understanding of
the processes described here; but I will leave it to the reader to make his/her own
assessment of my neutrality and objectivity.
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would call the extended family of aunts, uncles, cousins, and even
family friends. 1
04
The genius of the F1DA model is that it embraces this expanded
notion of the individual within a community context. Instead of
looking solely to a narrow definition of legal rights and duties, FIDA
peacemaking asks attorneys, government ministers, and judges to
consider non-litigious ways that an entire dispute, or aspects of a
dispute, could be resolved with the involvement of the largest
number of relevant persons, not the smallest. Why? Because almost
any ostensibly legal conflict may be less about the law than about the
people involved, and people in the Niger Delta do not live without a
social context. If the parties are truly to understand each other, reach
a workable agreement between each other, and hold to that
agreement, they must be able to see each other through the lens of
their social context, agree within the parameters of their social
context, and be supported by others who comprise that social context.
For example, in the Niger Delta, a land dispute filed in civil court
as a property matter between two men is much more complex than it
may appear. The land in dispute may involve immediate family
living together in the same house. Three to four houses of several
other family members may be located together in one family
compound, with each of these families carrying a concern in the land
dispute. Family compounds are part of a larger community with
several other such compounds. A grouping of such communities
represents an entire clan in the region. This is known as the "House
System"' 0 5 of the Niger Delta, wherein at each step along the way -
house, compound, community, and clan - there is a king or chief to
whom 0ersons traditionally turn for guidance in resolving a
dispute.
We shall return shortly to dispute resolution within the House
System, and its adjuncts. For now, our focus rests on the ever-
expanding role of others in what Americans might style as a two-
104. See HOLLOS & LEIS, supra note 104, at 35-63 (giving a detailed and
illuminating discussion of the methodological difficulties in attempting to impose a
Western template of family definitions on the family structure of the Niger Delta
peoples).
105. This is the term preferred by the Nigerian delegation. (See infra, note
109.)
106. Id.
party case. These other persons do not have de jure named party
status in litigation. Nevertheless, they have de facto status in the
world to which the parties will return after leaving the hearing room.
It is highly unlikely that they would all be able to participate directly
or indirectly if the matter were litigated. However, their input, and
even, perhaps, their physical presence, would be respected in the
House System.
This leads to the paradoxical result that if public disputes are
resolved through private ordering of this sort, there would be no such
thing as a shadowy, back-room deal. With the eyes of virtually the
entire compound, community or clan observing the conduct of the
discussions, there is no place to hide. Transparency is assured to a
degree unimagined in litigation.'
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3. Authority Versus Power
Litigation looks to the courts and administrative agencies to
mandate certain behavior through varying degrees of compulsion.
Compliance is compelled through force of law. The long-term
success of mediated agreements, on the other hand, characteristically
rests upon parties' voluntary compliance because they have
contributed to fashioning the terms. Willing buy-in equals a willing
implementation, with less disruption to relationships.
This widely accepted construction of the benefits of ADR
operates from a premise that usually goes unexamined: namely, the
difference between resolutions resulting from an exercise of authority
and resolutions emanating from an invocation of power. "Authority"
as used here refers to sovereignty, dominance, or command; control
given externally through outside, governmental structures. "Power,"
107. VICTOR C. UCHENDU, THE IGBO OF SOUTHEAST NIGERIA 17 (Holt,
Rhinehart & Winston, 1965) (discussing that the concept of transparency had
currency among the tribes of this region long before the term came in Western
vogue. In the Niger Delta, people are expected to live "transparent lives"; leaders
are expected to emphasize "transparent orientation." At least among the Igbo,
"secretive processes are held in contempt as not being properly socialized." This
also means that since the "concept of the good life" is "so built on the transparency
theme ... the individual dreads any form of loss of face. The major deterrent to
crime is not guilt-feeling but shame-feeling").
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by contrast, refers to willing compliance given by the people. It is
the use of influence which derives from internal social and religious
structures.l°8 Persons and institutions holding such power do so by
dint of the respect they have earned in the conduct of their lives or by
mastering various levels of traditional wisdom.
Thus, the Anglo-Nigerian system of administrative and civil
justice relies upon lawyers to manipulate the authority of the justice
of the peace, the civil courts, and the administrative courts. These
entities enforce their authority through the issuance of orders,
decrees, injunctions, summonses, writs, liens, levies and
garnishments.
The House System of the Niger Delta relies upon the king/chief
of the family, compound, or community and the tribal council. But
their power is circumscribed. The people of the Niger Delta
traditionally handle their affairs in a manner reminiscent of the Greek
City-State democracies.1 9  Hence, resolutions reached through the
House System are reached not by fiat but through consultation.
Compliance is obtained through respect for the traditional ways.
Non-compliance is punished by shunning, ostracization, and loss of
face. " 
0
108. I thank Sue Darst Tate, Director of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
System, Administrative Office of the Courts, Oklahoma Supreme Court for this
insight. It proved an extremely helpful construct in the Nigerian Mediation
Exchange workshop of June 2002.
109. This apt analogy was repeated in Michael S. 0. Olisa, Political Culture
and Political Stability in Traditional Igbo Society, 3 THE CONCH 16 (September
1971):
The mechanism of the political system of the Igbo is based on ideas
reminiscent of the great statement of Edward III of Britain in summoning
the First Parliament, namely that "What touches all must be approved by
all." Traditional Igbo, on account of this, is thus spoken of as practicing
primary democracy similar to that of the classical Greek states. At all
levels of society every adult male is entitled to direct participation in the
task of political decision making.
Id. at 25.
110. Id. at 27. ("Because it touches the very roots of communal life without
which the individual or the group finds no meaning in life, ostracism is ... reserved
as a weapon of last resort in the process of group coercion." Id.). The most famous
illustrations of these processes in action can be found in the classic novel by
CHINUA ACHEBE, THINGS FALL APART (Anchor Books 1994) (1959), which depicts
several historically accurate scenes of indigenous justice at work: (1) the resolution
of a family dispute involving spousal abuse and a request for return of the bride-
The fully developed mechanisms of social control reach still
farther and prove vital to the establishment and maintenance of a
lasting resolution. Families and communities organize themselves
around additional circles of influence. These groupings might
include: (1) titled elders; (2) lineage groups which could be small, at
the sub-village level, or include the village group as a whole; (3)
kindred meetings; (4) family meetings; or (5) adult women of the
kindred known as the Umuada or Umuokpu. 11
Additional "pressure points" can also stimulate resolution
through consultation with the disputants, as age grades might become
involved. These are gender-segregated groupings of persons
dedicated to provide mutual support and guidance throughout the
various passages of maturity. Traditional religion continues to
play a meaningful, albeit less publicly acknowledged, role. Thus, the
priesthood and medicine men may need to be consulted, if only to
allay potential rivalries between the religious and social institutions.
Women's societies, fraternities, and secret societies can guide the
conduct of their members through direct and indirect means, by
price; wherein the egwugwu (mystical council of elders) arbitrate between two
families, determining "It is not bravery when a man fights with a woman" and
directs reconciliation. Id. at 87-94; and (2) when the protagonist Okonkwo
inadvertently kills a boy in a funeral dance, and has thereby committed his third
abomination against the sacred harmony of the village, he is exiled to his mother's
village. Id. at 120-125. The reader interested in a fuller historical and social
analysis of this landmark work should consider KALU OGBAA, UNDERSTANDING
THINGS FALL APART: A STUDENT CASEBOOK TO ISSUES, SOURCES AND HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS (Greenwood Press 1999).
111. See OLISA supra note 110 at 23-25. (These descriptions are summarized
from various sources, written and unwritten).
112. One picture of age-grades among men suggests a glimpse into these often
secret societies. Names are chosen that carry the tone of their self-image; e.g.,
Egbara, "the name of a prickly seed" - suggesting that "if any one interferes with
the members of the grade he will get scratched." A female age-grade might be
named, for example, "The Basins" which translates as "The discreet ones." C.K.
MEEK, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN A NIGERIAN TRIBE: A STUDY IN INDIRECT RULE
197 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1937). The age-grades serve the important function of
"guarding public morality," beginning with its own members. "It took common
action against any of its members who committed an offence or behaved in an
unseemly manner. Thus, if any one had committed a theft, he would be called
upon by his grade to restore the stolen property and pay to the grade a fine of one
goat." Id. at 198.
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serving as arbiter to a dispute or downgrading the status of members
within the association.
Among all these circles of influence, Umuada or Umuokpu are
probably the most powerful. They hold the ultimate social sanction
against one who fails to conform to the community's sense of what is
ethically appropriate conduct in resolving a dispute. The profoundly
critical duty of burying family members rests with the women of the
kindred. Thus, if a person has failed to live up to the conduct
expected by the Umuada or Umuokpu, the women may refuse burial
rites. The transgressor would be compelled to handle all matters
directly themselves, without assistance from anyone in the village to
wash the body, obtain a coffin, prepare a burial ground, carry the
coffin, and provide an appropriate series of memorials (replete with
food for dozens, or even hundreds of people).' 13
Since there is no funeral industry in rural Nigeria - and very little
in the urban areas - this sanction cannot be avoided by merely paying
for the services to be provided commercially. The power of the
Umuada/Umuokpu is thereby rendered inescapable. This leads to
another paradox: that in a clearly patriarchal system, the women
sometimes hold ultimate power, enabling them to resolve disputes the
men have found intractable.'
1 4
B. The FIDA Peacemaking Model
The FIDA peacemaking model takes a salient step beyond most
ADR programs. Instead of focusing solely on litigants, lawyers and
judges, FIDA has broken through class lines to incorporate village
women as the centerpiece of their mediation efforts. Some 600
village peacemakers have been trained since 2000 in a style of
mediation adapted from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's facilitative
model known as Early Settlement. The "standard" ADR trainees
have not been neglected. Approximately 70 lawyers, administrators,
113. See, OLISA, supra note 110, at 24. Again, I must express my profound
gratitude to our Nigerian delegation for unpacking the full meaning of a refusal of
burial rites. In so many written sources it is described as a withholding of
"mourners," which for most Westerners does not carry the weight that this more
detailed description conveys.
114. Id. at25.
government ministers and jurists have also taken part in FIDA
peacemaking workshops.
At the request of FIDA Rivers State, the author consulted with
FIDA pro bono to identify appropriate applications of this facilitative
approach for the Niger Delta, using the FIDA vision of bridging civil
and traditional venues. The author had already modified the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's standard model to be more culturally
responsive to the preferences and communication styles of
traditionally-oriented Native Americans. Because Oklahoma's large
Native population is highly dispersed, urban, and usually inter-
married, the Oklahoma tribal peacemaking model is not tied to the
traditions of any specific Native American nation. Instead, it
emphasizes the principles of communal harmony and quality of life
shared by all, irrespective of tribe.
Similarly, the FIDA peacemaking model was tailored around the
core values shared by virtually all persons in the Niger Delta, without
reference to any single ethnic group or community. Maintaining this
common ground was central to its success, for in the Delta, tribal
issues lie at the base of most conflicts, no matter how these conflicts
might appear on the surface. FIDA considered it crucial to have a
model that could speak in a unifying voice to all participants. They
did not want the mediation model itself to become an unnecessary
source of further struggle over whose values or style should be
employed.
The generic Early Settlement model was crafted and has been
uniformly used throughout Oklahoma for implementation of the
Court's ethics rules for mediators, embodied in the Code of
Professional Conduct. The Court places protection of party self-
determination at the heart of the mediation process. Affirmative
steps are required to assure mediators are in fact, and give every
appearance of being neutral and unbiased. Typically, the Early
Settlement mediator is a stranger to the parties and to the conflict.1 6
115. ADRS BASIC TRAINING MANUAL 9-47; 9-48 (February, 1994)
(displaying the forms used to assess mediator performance. One category is
empathy, defined as "conspicuous awareness and consideration of the needs of
others." At the high end, evaluating a mediator-candidate as performing very well,
the mediator "avoided appearance of bias or favoritism for or against either party."
At the low end, evaluating a mediator-candidate as performing poorly, the mediator
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While FIDA village peacemakers will likely know many of the
disputants in advance, they are not to be direct stakeholders. Indeed,
the village peacemaker system was designed to ensure that other
trained FIDA peacemakers would be at hand to assist, to guide, even
to assume responsibility for interventions where any one person
might appear to have a conflict of interest. Another aspect of FIDA
peacemaking contributes to its reputation for integrity: the village
peacemakers serve without remuneration.
FIDA peacemakers have earned a growing reputation not only for
personal integrity, but also for unwavering respect of others. F1DA
peacemaking highlights the dignity of every person, regardless of
social status. This feature of the Oklahoma Court model proved a
valuable adaptation. Further, the Oklahoma model operates in a
manner compatible with the decorum expected in the Niger Delta.
Whether standard Early Settlement mediation or tribal peacemaking,
the process is less than formal, yet never casual. The stylized
communication allows the mediator to restate and reframe statements
in ways that allow the speaker to save face, while still acknowledging
emotion and the vulnerability such revelations can entail.
would have: asked misleading, loaded or unfair questions exhibiting bias, engaged
in oppressive questioning to the disadvantage of one of the parties, threatened
more than persuaded, came into the discussion abruptly to challenge others [or]
disregarded others' warnings. Id.).
116. CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2001).
B.2. The responsibility of the mediator to the mediation process.... b. When
it is improper to be a mediator . . . (3) The mediator who has biases or
prejudices either for or against one of the parties or the issues in dispute shall
not accept the role of mediator. c. Mediator's impartiality. (1) The mediator
shall maintain impartiality at all times. (2) The mediator does not represent a
party of mediation in court concerning the issues which were the subject of
mediation. ... (4) The responsibility of the mediator to the sponsoring agency
and to the profession. a. Mediator's role during mediation. ...(3) The mediator
shall work within the policy of the sponsoring agency, and shall avoid the
appearance of impropriety. (4) The mediator shall not use the third-party role
for personal gain or advantage. ... (6) The mediator shall not voluntarily incur
obligations or perform professional services that might interfere with the
ability to act as an impartial mediator.
12 O.S. § 1801 et seq. Appendix A.
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C. Informal + Flexible + Transparent = Lasting, Public Resolution
The FIDA peacemaking model brings to the resolution of public
disputes an enlarged vision. Rather than rely on the rigid, rote
systems of formal adjudication - be it civil or administrative court -
narrowing the parties to the least number possible, the FIDA
approach reaches out to include as many persons as feasible in the
resolution of problems that "touch all." The FIDA model recognizes
the severe limitations of governmental, external authority to oversee
a lasting, voluntary settlement of a community dispute.
Understanding these limitations, FIDA looks to the strengths of
viable, traditional social groupings to gain their active participation in
crafting the resolution.
IV. THE NEXT GENERATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADR: BRIDGING
CULTURES WITHIN AMERICA
This paper has worked from the premise that "culture" in
America connotes more than ethnicity alone. Rather, culture
embraces the world view of an industry, of an agency and of lay
members of the public themselves. Amongst these disparate and
disputing cultures, the ALJ seeks to bring common understanding;
not necessarily agreement, but at least a clearly enunciated result that
makes sense. The task becomes more challenging each year as the
cases and gaps in understanding become more intricate, both
substantively and procedurally.
As cautioned in Part II of this paper, the institutions of
administrative ADR may be replicating themselves rapidly; perhaps
too much so. One must question whether this growth has relied upon
repeating more or less the same template in agency after agency.
While this may be an excellent way to introduce the basic concept of
ADR - typically, mediation - it may not be the best way to assure
continued innovation. The creativity which Congress had sought
under ADRA, with the purposefully flexible definitions of ADR and
statutory protections for adjudicators to experiment, may soon
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become if not dead letter, then at best, forgotten letter. One expanded
hypothetical has been selected to synthesize the lessons identified.
A. A First-Generation Agency ADR Proceeding - Ignoring the
Community
1. Resolutions Achieved Through the Use of Authority
Let us revisit the purpose of ADR. According to ADRA at
Section 556(c), an agency should not employ ADR when an
"authoritative proceeding" is required, or when there must be
"authoritative precedent." Note ADRA's use of the term "authority."
Through the lens of the Niger Delta experience, this looks different
than before. We see in a fresh light that ADR does not truly suit
matters which require external, government-given controls if the
resolution is to work. Instead, we can now invert the analysis and see
the promise that ADR could hold. Namely, ADR could be ideal in
situations where persons or groups of persons with genuine power in
a community can participate in and support the implementation of a
resolution. More clearly, this refers to internal, people-given power
similar to that which has been recognized in the indigenous social
structures of the Niger Delta.
How could this apply in America? We might revisit any one of
the list of administrative agencies performing ADR currently, as
summarized in Part II. Let us choose, though, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture and its farmer-lender mediations. Although these
mediations typically do not entail the ethnic, tribal or racial
delineations typical of the Niger Delta, they do arise within
communities that are sufficiently small, cohesive and interdependent
that they could provide a meaningful parallel.
Let us elaborate upon an example shared by the director of the
USDA's Agricultural Mediation Program:
A farmer took out a series of mortgage loans from the USDA. At
the time the loans were extended, the farmer's assets provided
sufficient collateral. After three years of drought, the value of his
crops and his land plummeted. He has defaulted on his loans. The
farmer requested a mediation with the Farm Service Agency (FSA)
under the USDA Certified State Agricultural Mediation Program.' 17
The farmer provided a substantial amount of financial information to
the financial analyst at the mediation program, on the understanding
that all mediation documents were not to be used for any other legal
action.118  The farmer provided detailed information with the
assurance from the mediator that his statements and documentation
would be kept confidential."' 9 Some time after the mediation has
been completed, the USDA Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
requested copies of certain documents provided by the farmer in the
mediation, as part of the loan work-out. The OIG suspected the loan
work-out may have involved some element of fraud involving the
mortgage loan repayment, funded through the USDA.
This scenario describes cases that resulted in major litigation, yet
still have not resulted in definitive answers. As a matter of law, the
question is: Can the OIG obtain these documents? The answers
differ. In Breakey v. United States Depart. ofAgriculture, the answer
was "no." 120  Mere "official curiosity" does not provide sufficient
grounds for the agency to obtain access to protected documents. 121 In
re Grand Jury Proceedings122 reached the opposite result. 123
2. The Hypothetical Aftermath
Needless to say, the results of the mediation and its aftermath
have been unfavorable for all involved. We shall extrapolate beyond
the case as presented, beyond the time period of the appellate briefs,
117. 7 U.S.C. § 5101(1)(A) (2000).
118. Id.
119. 7 U.S.C. § 5101(3)(D) (2000).
120. Breakey v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 836 F. Supp. 422 (E.D.
Mich. 1993).
121. Id.
122. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998).
123. This scenario and summary were adapted from "United States
Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency Agricultural Mediation Program"
by Chester A. Bailey, USDA Agricultural Mediation Program, and "No Fear?
Confidentiality Day-to-Day in Federal Dispute Resolution" by Charles Pou, Jr.,
former director of the dispute resolution program of the Administrative Conference
of the United States and co-author of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,
both in the ABA Federal ADR Desk Book (2002).
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to see a network of people in disarray. The farmer eventually lost his
farm. The lender, who used to be a family friend, and the farmer no
longer speak. Because of the tension between them, their families no
longer attend the same church. Their breach has begun to unravel the
small congregation.
The children of the farmer and lender, who attend the same
school, are no longer friends; and their rift has filtered through their
classmates just as surely as it has in the church. Various members of
the small town perceive the lender as a "cold-hearted, money-
grubber;" others perceive the farmer as a "dead beat." Grumblings
begin to echo that for each man these character flaws were
generational; "after all, his daddy was like that, too."
Unfortunately, one can extrapolate even farther and use a story
right from the American Midwest in the 1980s as farm land prices
collapsed. The psychological and emotional strain on farmers and
lenders alike became unbearable in many rural communities.
Domestic violence escalated. All too frequently, the strain literally
exploded as farmers resolved their dilemma in a most desperate
fashion: by shooting the lender, their family and themselves.
It was in recognition of this dire human toll that the USDA had
originally begun the farmer-lender mediation program. Yet, it seems
that over time it, like so many other ADR innovations, risks losing its
expansive vision. Its mediations risk becoming routine, rigid, with
few signs of its origins in concern for the family and community life
of rural America.
Indeed, the hypothetical aftermath described here illustrates
circles of expanding relationships that have been disrupted by the
poor outcome of the farmer-lender mediation. How much more
preferable it would have been to foresee these circles of social
relationships and work with them in a positive way.
B. A Next Generation Agency ADR Proceeding - Honoring the
Community
How could that expanded vision of the early USDA mediation
program be restored? Let us re-do the farmer-lender mediation along
the lines of a FIDA peacemaking, adapted to American
circumstances. Return to the legal issue which gave rise to the
request for the ostensibly confidential documents to be provided to
OIG: Had fraud been committed? From one perspective: Did the
farmer fully disclose all assets that he was required to? From another
perspective: Had the lender somehow betrayed the farmer by
indicating to the USDA that there had been less than full disclosure
of assets?
Once more we are compelled to deal with the bedrock issue of
trust, and the path for achieving it: transparency. The more open
and accessible the process is, the more readily participants will trust
each other and the outcome. How could the mediation have been
made more user-friendly in the ways that ultimately matter most?
1. First contact with the administrative process
In FIDA peacemaking, the first contact a disputant has with the
administrative process may be the village peacemaker, not a
government official or employee. Moreover, the village peacemakers
are women known to the people involved, although the peacemakers
are not stakeholders. They come with innate credibility because of
their typically long-standing relationship with the disputants. They
have earned respect by dint of their character.
The USDA has done an excellent job at attempting to put in place
financial planners/ counselors who assist farmers in preparing an
appropriate response to the foreclosure action. However well-
meaning these counselors may be, they typically are not persons with
whom the farmer has a prior, personal relationship. The counselors
are paid by the government and the wary farmer perceives them as
representing the government's interests, not his own.
Consider the difference in having the first contact be not a
financial planner or counselor but a member of a local social
organization with which the farmer has an already established
relationship. The choices could range from the Farm Bureau to
members of Kiwanis, to parents of the local FFA chapter. These
trained volunteers would not replace the USDA technical support
staff rendering financial planning and counseling services. They
would, however, be an initial contact that could more effectively,
sensitively bridge the gap between lay person and government
agency, so the farmer has a clearer understanding of the overall
process, options and realistic expectations.
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As much as anything else, the role of such trained volunteers
would be to listen fully to the fears and frustrations of the farmer,
using active listening techniques of restating, reflecting and
refraining. For this intervention authority is not necessary; only the
power of informal social support networks.
In addition to helping the farmer allay some of the initial
apprehension that derives solely from being presented with a strange
and formidable undertaking, the peacemaker-style intervention can
help parties think beyond their stated positions to know their
underlying interests. In this expanded, non-directive exploration of
their situation, the farmer can re-evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of his situation; consider new options; and prepare to
entertain novel suggestions from the lender.
Finally, the peacemaker-style intervener can help all participants
think about the networks of social support within their community
that could facilitate and support the crafting of a workable resolution.
2. Circles of Influence
When the ill-feelings between the farmer and lender began to
spill over into the church and school, all could see the circles of
influence within which they operated. The fabric of the town began
to unravel because for so many persons, the matter of whether the
farmer kept his farm, and how he was treated in the foreclosure
process touched them. Perhaps they saw it as a projection of where
they, themselves, might be in only a few more months. Perhaps they
saw it as a reflection of where they had been a few years ago.
Perhaps it represents for them the loss of a way of life for their
family, and especially for their adult children. "What touches all
must be approved by all" - if not directly, then at least indirectly.
Consider what persons or associations were touched by, and
could potentially have influenced, the farmer's and the lender's
crisis. Within their church, the Churchmen's Association might have
played a conciliatory role. Might we even go so far as to suggest that
if there were concerns about the degree of disclosure of assets,
perhaps a respected member of their men's group could have been
invited to observe the discussions? Or, even to participate?
This suggestion calls for a level of openness and literal
transparency that shocks the American conscience. At any rate, it
runs counter to the contemporary, urban mind-set which privileges
privacy, isolation and autonomy above community. However, these
may not be the shared values of many rural towns in America. If we
are to keep ADR flexible and adaptable to meet changing
circumstances wherever where it is applied, we also need to permit
waiver of procedural protections that would bar such innovations.
3. Supportive Implementation, Not Compulsory Enforcement
Finally, we turn to the families, especially the children of the
farmer and lender. Again, the original vision of the USDA
agricultural mediation program was to provide a mechanism for
foreclosure that would be less onerous than litigation. The mediation
program could permit a dignified end to a farmer's dream. The
reduction in shame and rage should, ideally, reduce or even eliminate
the fracturing of friendships within small farming communities.
One can readily imagine the taunting between children when one
family has slid into bankruptcy and another family appears to have
pushed them under. Granted, this is not necessarily the reality. But it
may well be the perception as held by young people, overhearing the
conversations of their elders. How might this budding rift be
addressed?
Whereas in most urban areas one- might readily suggest
counseling or therapy, those services typically are not available in
rural areas. Or, if present, such services may be shunned, being seen
as embarrassing admissions of weakness. Where could the family
members, especially the children, find circles of support? How might
those circles indirectly raise the level of trust between the farmer and
lender?
This may be an area where the Parent Teachers Association at
school, the Order of the Eastern Star, or the Churchwomen's
Association could have played a role. Children are unlikely to act
out their hostilities against each other in the presence of their parents.
But, they might engage in negative behavior within earshot of other
adults.
Consider the impact of having engaged such a group in
consultations about how these matters should be handled in front of
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the children: What are appropriate, acceptable words to describe the
situation? What values does the community want to convey?
In many farming towns, one still finds a traditional sense of
community-wide responsibility for the behavior of children; unlike in
urban areas where people remain strangers to each other. Thus, the
women could be charged with watchful, compassionate intervention
if and when they observe strains between the children concerning the
foreclosure.
C. Further Applications
This expanded concept of ADR need not be limited solely to
small communities in rural areas. Even in larger, urban settings one
readily finds communities of coherent interests and values. There
may be, nevertheless, an ever-present gap in communication between
the culture of those communities and any given administrative
agency.
The classic situations involve claims of discrimination in
employment or in contracting. In closing, let us consider another
application of the FIDA model, as described below:
In a dispute with the General Services Administration, might we
include a minority business trade association to assist in articulating
the standards of expected conduct for government suppliers? Would
a minority supplier be more ready to hear under these circumstances
than if it came from the government side alone - since the AU or
mediator would likely be perceived as representatives of the
government? The trade association could continue to consult with
the supplier to ensure efficient, ethical compliance with standards.
In a Merit Protection Commission dispute concerning appropriate
work place conduct when a Native American employee is ill, might
we include a respected member from one of the complainant's own
tribal dance (religious) groups to discuss with all parties differences
in cultural values and etiquette concerning illness? By involving an
additional community resource in the problem-solving process the
resolution may offer improved assurances of compliance.
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CONCLUSION
The administrative judge has led the way in integrating the
sometimes conflicting cultural expectations which collide in agency
adjudications. We have learned much in America about how to make
the formal adjudicatory process accessible to most lay persons.
Regrettably, adjudications are quickly becoming nearly as complex
and cumbersome as the civil court litigations they were designed to
replace. We have turned enthusiastically to ADR as a solution, a way
to return the informal adjudicatory process to something flexible and
human. Yet, soon, ADR may also become ossified, with increasingly
routinized and rigid concepts of mediation.
This paper has presented a look at mediation from another
cultural perspective, as developed in the Niger Delta. While it would
be impossible and inadvisable to attempt to transplant the FIDA
peacemaking model intact, many valuable principles can,
nevertheless, refresh the practice of ADR in our administrative
system.
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